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Abstract What does ‘likely’ mean, when respondents estimate the risk to become a victim
of crime? Victimization risks can either be interpreted as gains (“being spared of offences”) or
as losses (“becoming a victim of crime”). Because losses are perceived as more severe, respon-
dents will state lower subjective victimization probabilities in the loss-frame, compared to
the gain-frame. We demonstrate such a framing-effect with data from an experimental survey.
Furthermore, we show that the meaning of vague quantifiers varies with the frequency and
the severity of the event. Respondents assign to the same vague quantifiers (e.g. ‘unlikely’)
higher likelihoods in terms of percentages for frequent and for less severe events than for
infrequent and for severe events. In conclusion, respondents do not use vague quantifiers
consistently so that it is problematic to compare subjective risks for different victimizations.
Keywords Response effects · Framing · Vague quantifiers · Survey methodology ·
Conversational norms
1 Introduction
“I thought you’d never come here again,“ I said.
“Every time I see you, you say the same thing,” she said, laughing. As always, she sat
down next to me at the bar and rested both hands on the counter. “But I did write you
a note saying I wouldn’t be back for a while, didn’t I?”
“For a while is a phrase whose length can’t be measured. At least by the person who’s
waiting,” I said.
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“But there must be times when the word’s necessary. Situations when that’s the only
possible word you can use,” she said.
“And probably is a word whose weight is incalculable.”
Murakami (2000, italics inserted by the authors)
The popular Japanese writer Haruki Murakami is pointing to a problem which is not only
raised in literature, but in science as well. When you walk through a scientific library, you
come across entire book shelves dealing with the issue. Nevertheless, scientists are not sat-
isfied with statements that the values of phrases like “for a while” or “probably” are simply
immeasurable. Several attempts have been made to quantify such vague quantifiers. Simp-
son’s (1944) essay was one of the first which dealt with expressions of frequency and their
related meaning. In the meanwhile, it has been uncovered that the relation between verbal
expressions and quantitative measures bears high uncertainty. We can distinguish between
intra-individual and inter-individual differences (Budescu and Wallsten 1995, p. 289 f.).
Hakel (1969, p. 533) states the problem of inter-individual differences quite clearly with his
often quoted remark, “one man’s ‘rarely’ is another man’s ‘hardly ever”’. Bradburn and Miles
(1979, p. 94) described with a compelling example intra-individual differences: “The mean
response for ‘sometimes’ in the shooting in Hollywood westerns context is higher than the
mean response for ‘very often’ in the context of earthquakes.” For survey methodology, the
meaning of vague quantifiers is of particular interest, as we infer from frequency statements
in questionnaires the validity of theories.1
The goal of our study is to improve our understanding of respondents’ interpretation
of probability expressions. Such interpretations have two aspects; first the perception and
second the communication of probabilities. We conducted two analyses with a focus on
subjective probabilities to become a victim of crime. In our first analysis, we demonstrate the
sensitivity of subjective perceptions of victimization probabilities. We show that subjective
victimization probabilities are prone to framing-effects. Our second analysis focuses on the
communication of victimization probabilities. Here, we show that the framing of victimiza-
tion scenarios has an impact on the meaning of vague quantifiers. In particular, we show that
the frame of reference determines the mapping of probabilities. This effect can mainly be
explained by the different frequency of the particular event: ‘To become a victim’ is rarer
than ‘not to become a victim’. We argue with Bradburn and Miles (1979, p. 94) that for rare
incidents, often refers to lower frequencies than for common incidents.
We analyze two aspects of survey responses: First, we analyze wording effects for dif-
ferent frames of victimization scenarios in terms of gains versus losses. Second, we analyze
the meaning of probability statements via mapping the vague quantifiers to numeric expres-
sions. Our findings can be applied to various fields of interest, for instance to medicine. It is
known (Edwards et al. 2001; Welkenhuysen et al. 2001; Peters et al. 2006) that the chosen
frame of communicating health risks (e.g. the probability of suffering from side effects or
the probability of cancer) influences patients’ decisions for or against preventive medical
checkups.2
1 One example for the usage of vague quantifiers can be found in the British Crime Survey: “First, how likely
do you think your home is to be burgled in the next year? (…) And how likely do you think you are mugged
or robbed in the next year?” Possible answer categories are: Very likely, fairly likely, fairly unlikely and very
unlikely (British Crime Survey 2004/2005).
2 Depending on whether losses in terms of side effects or gains in terms of being spared of cancer are stressed,
patients make decisions in favour of or against medical check-ups.
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2 Literature review
2.1 Communication of probabilities
Like in every-day language, vague quantifiers are also used in scientific studies. For instance,
people are asked to specify the frequency of certain behaviour with often, frequently, seldom
and never, as “how often have you been happy in the past week?” However, the usage of
vague quantifiers often implies biased comparability of item responses (Schnell and Kreuter
2000; Kreuter 2002, pp. 226–229). Nevertheless, they are still applied despite the availability
of alternatives such as measurement via numerical frequency scales. So why is it that we still
use vague quantifiers instead of asking for the precise value?
First of all it can be said that vague quantifiers are the natural answer to many questions
(Wallsten et al. 1993). The question about the rate of happiness in the past week is difficult
to answer with precise frequency measures. Thus, interviewees prefer to answer such ques-
tions verbally and not numerically (Moxey and Sanford 2000). In contrast, it is preferred
to receive information numerically (Budescu and Wallsten 1995, p. 298). If interviewees
are nevertheless asked to quantify their answers, most answer the question after some time
of reflection. Only very few refuse an answer (Bradburn and Miles 1979, p. 95). However,
precise quantitative evaluations are difficult and require high cognitive efforts (Peters et al.
2006, p. 46). Thus, much time and concentration is needed for the interview. In addition, it
occurs that in fact there is no precise answer but the respondent makes up the quantitative
information randomly (Conrad et al. 1998, p. 363). Furthermore, answers to retrospective
questions are influenced by the respondents’ strategy to derive an exact answer (Conrad et
al. 1998). Depending on the nature and the frequency of the incident, the respondent counts
his experiences, makes an extrapolation or generates a number from the data known to him
from other sources. However, it is not apparent to the interviewer, which strategy was chosen
for which question. As a consequence, the precision of the information remains uncertain.
As numeric answers often suggest an artificial degree of precision, which is not reflected
by respondents’ characteristics, it seems more adequate to use vague quantifiers—if we only
knew what they meant. If it was known which vague quantifier is related to which numeric
value, it would be possible to use the more comprehensible method of vague quantifiers in
surveys and to translate their meaning afterwards into quantitative information. The mapping
method serves this purpose in allocating numeric values to vague quantifiers (Wright et al.
1994, p. 481).
The theoretical foundation of the mapping method is the concept of membership
functions (Hammerton 1976). In particular, it is assumed that verbal probability expres-
sions are imprecise concepts, which can be represented by numeric probabilities
between 0 and 1. The membership function for a specific verbal expression assigns
a number to each value between 0 and 1. This number defines the degree of consis-
tency between the verbal expression and the numeric probability: “Probability phrases are
vague concepts and (…) different numerical probabilities in the [0, 1] range are repre-
sented to various degrees in these concepts. (…) The membership function of any given
phrase assigns a number to each value on the probability line [0, 1] that represents its
degree of membership in the concept defined by the phrase.” (Karelitz and Budescu 2004,
p. 27).
Early studies assumed for each verbal expression only one membership function
(Hammerton 1976). But soon, it was realized that membership functions and mapping tech-
niques can be largely influenced by various factors. Psychological studies often emphasize
the importance of the context. Goocher (1965) argues that mapping depends on respondents’
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affection for the object. The more respondents like an event or an object, the smaller the
frequency expressions used. Pepper and Prytulak (1974) and Moxey and Sanford (1993);
Moxey and Sanford (2000) demonstrate the effect of base rate expectations: “In particular,
if an event has a high base-rate expectation, such as people enjoying parties, then the val-
ues assigned to (say) many in many people enjoyed the party is higher than it is for a low
baserate expectation (as in many of the doctors in the hospital were female).” (Moxey and
Sanford 2000, p. 241). Furthermore, Schwarz et al. (1985) stress the impact of scaling. If
the lower part of the scale is subdivided into many subtle categories, respondents state lower
TV consumption compared to if the upper part of the scale is strongly subdivided.3 Finally,
Hörmann (1983) and Newstead and Coventry (2000) show that the size of the particular
object in the question matters: “[A] few people in front of a building meant more than a few
people standing in front of a hut” (Newstead and Coventry 2000, p. 244).
So far, we dealt with cases for which the interpretation of vague quantifiers affects all
respondents similarly. However, cases are even more problematic in which the interpretation
of vague quantifiers affects particular groups differently. It is possible that regression esti-
mates of group differences for particular opinions or attitudes are not due to actual group
differences in these opinions but to group differences in interpreting the scales. Schaeffer
(1991) could demonstrate such an effect. She asked black and white respondents to specify
their frequency of being bored. When using numeric values, she found no differences. How-
ever, when asked with vague quantifiers, black respondents answered to be more frequently
bored than white respondents. Furthermore, Nakao and Axelrod (1983) show such group
differences between doctors and patients in interpreting verbal frequency expressions like
“infrequent” or “not frequently”. Finally, King et al. (2004) demonstrate cultural differences
in using response scales.
Wänke (2002) highlighted the importance of reference groups. Students who compare
themselves with the entire population, estimate the frequency of going to the cinema higher
than those comparing themselves to other students. Likewise, the field of reference matters.
“For example, when judging how often one goes to the movies, the response may depend on
whether one compares this behaviour to the frequency one attends poetry readings or watches
TV.” (Wänke 2002, p. 302).
Wright et al. (1994) categorize the various factors of differential mapping effects into two
classes. On the one hand, mapping depends on information from own experiences. When
asked to assign numeric values to the undefined adjectives very young, young, old, very old,
respondents’ own age influences their answers. This assumption is called the self-informa-
tion-hypothesis. On the other hand, mapping is influenced by characteristics of the social
group, i.e. behaviour or language. Wright et al. (1994) illustrate this point with a vivid exam-
ple. Consider two isolated villages, where the inhabitants are asked for their height by using
vague quantifiers. Let us assume that the height of the people in the first village is 1.80 m, and
in the other village, all people are 1.90 m tall. Naturally, every respondent who is requested
to estimate her height compares herself to the known others in her village and concludes that
she has an average height. Conclusively, everybody categorizes herself in the middle of the
scale. Thus, the usage of vague quantifiers leads to the result that inhabitants of both villages
are estimated to have the same height—which is not the case. The idea, that membership in
3 Comparable effects as those for asking about the frequency of television consumption were observed for
other behavioural patterns such as sexual behaviour or consumer behaviour (Schwarz and Scheuring 1988;
Menon et al. 1995). In addition, similar effects occurred when patients reported their rate of suffering from
physical symptoms (Schwarz and Scheuring 1992).
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social groups affects mapping is known as the group-norm-hypothesis. Wright et al. (1994)
confirm both hypotheses in their study on TV consumption.4
2.2 Perception of probabilities
We know that the subjective perceptions of probabilities are prone to presentational effects.
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) describe in their classic study on framing two alternative
scenarios for fighting an epidemic; a safe and a risky one. In one case, the result is described
in terms of saved lives, in the other in terms of lives lost. Although both scenarios have the
same statistical expectation value and are formally equivalent, respondents choose the risky
option when confronted with the loss-frame (number of lives lost), and the safe option when
confronted with the gain-frame (number of lives saved).
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) suggests that a different point of reference
is induced if a decision problem is presented in terms of gains compared to losses. Thus, the
reference point differs between decisions which focus on gains and decisions which focus
on losses. The first assumption in prospect theory states that the value function is concave
for gains and convex for losses. The second assumption is that the value function is steeper
for losses than for gains. It can be inferred from these properties that an event with the same
probability of occurrence is psychologically more relevant in the loss-frame compared to the
gain-frame. In other words: To suffer from a particular loss with a likelihood of 5% is more
relevant than the chance of being spared from the same loss with a likelihood of 95%.
McNeil et al. (1982) could demonstrate this effect in clinical settings. Patients had to
decide whether they preferred a safe radio therapy or rather a risky surgery. In one condition,
the likelihoods were presented in terms of death rates and in the other condition in terms
of survival chances. If risks were presented in terms of death rates, fewer patients chose the
risky surgery, compared to when risks were presented in terms of survival chances. For an
overview of such framing effects in medical research see Marteau (1989), Banks et al. (1995)
and Edwards et al. (2001).
Moxey and Sanford (2000) show similar effects for consumption decisions. The respon-
dents were given two logically equivalent options to choose from—for instance 95% fat free
yoghurt and yoghurt containing 5% fat. Most favour the 95% fat free yoghurt. It is argued that
the wording causes this effect—in one case, the focus is on the positive aspect (fat free), in the
other case, the attention is drawn to the negative aspect. The result that logically equivalent
expressions are evaluated differently was already confirmed by Reyna (1981). She investi-
gated the effect of negations of modal adjectives (e.g. probably or possibly). It could be shown
that formal negations do not automatically imply complementary numerical estimations.5
3 Subjective perceptions of victimization probabilities
3.1 Hypotheses
We can derive the following hypotheses by applying the former reasoning to subjective
probability estimates of victimizations: Respondents prefer to face a situation with a 95%
4 When respondents are first asked about the frequency of television consumption of the “typical other person”
and afterwards about their own consumption behaviour, they state higher frequencies compared to the reversed
order of questions.
5 Note that for the construction of scales, the negations by means of an affix (improbable) are stronger than
the lexical negations (not probable).
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probability of not becoming a victim of crime compared to a situation with a 5% probability
to become a victim of crime. We argue that the optimism in the gain frame is due to a relatively
lower subjective victimization probability, compared to the loss frame. As a consequence it
is expected that the probability of being spared of victimization (gain frame) is downgraded
such that it corresponds subjectively with the probability to become a victim of crime (loss
frame). For example, the feeling of security for facing a ‘90% likelihood of being spared’
might be psychologically equivalent to a ‘5% likelihood to become victim of crime’. We
summarize our reasoning in our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The subjective victimization probability will be higher in the gain frame (being
spared of a crime) compared to the loss frame (become a victim of crime).
3.2 Method
We conducted an experimental survey in the German city Leipzig in August 2006. We asked
95 taxi drivers and 96 waiters (N=191) for an estimate of their probability to become a
victim of crime. We presented short scenarios for five different sorts of crime, in particular
for being involved in a car accident, bill-dodging, theft, robbery and murder. We chose taxi
drivers and waiters because both groups do their job in public and thus both are exposed to
a higher risk of victimization. The respondents were selected by a two-stage sample, with
taxi stands and restaurants as the first stage and respondents as the second stage. We drew a
random sample of the list of all taxi stands from the taxi cooperation in Leipzig. At each of
the taxi stands, we approached the second taxi in the row, and repeated this process for every
second taxi in the row. To select the waiters, we took a random sample from the list of the
IHK Leipzig (industry and trade organization Leipzig), containing all registered restaurants.
We used the last birthday method to select the waiters in a restaurant. The two versions of
the questionnaire were randomized.
Four interviewers conducted oral face-to-face interviews with two versions of the stan-
dardized questionnaire, which differed in the frames of presenting the probabilities. We asked
half of the respondents to estimate their probability to become a victim of crime (loss-frame),
while the other half was asked to estimate the probability of being spared of a crime (gain
frame). Furthermore, the questionnaire contained a control question for the victimization
‘robbery’. The control group had to respond the question twice in the loss frame and the
experimental group had to respond the question once in the loss-frame and once in the gain-
frame (intra-individual variation of the frame). In addition, respondents had first to evaluate
their probabilities on a verbal scale using vague quantifiers and then on numerical scales (see
Table 1). With the combination of vague quantifiers and numerical answers, we can apply
the mapping methodology and estimate response functions. Response functions relate the
verbal expressions on the x-axis with the numerical expressions on the y-axis. We asked for
responses for both the vague quantifiers and the numerical values in the questionnaire twice.
About 5 min elapsed between the two blocks of questions.
3.3 Results
First, we demonstrate framing-effects on numerical scales for subjective probabilities of
victimization. We compare the distribution of numerical victimization probabilities in the
gain-frame with the respective distribution in the loss-frame. We analyze the offences theft,
robbery and car accident (question 9) (Fig. 1).
The data confirm hypothesis 1 for the offences robbery and theft: Respondents estimate
higher victimization probabilities in the gain-frame, compared to the loss frame. For further
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Table 1 Items of the questionnaire
Question 1 First I would like to talk with you about your personal exposure to danger. I will present you
different situations and would like to ask you to estimate your likelihood that you get
involved in such a situation within the next 12 months. You find the scenarios on the
following cards.
How likely do you think is it that within the next 12 months
… a customer disappears without having paid?
… someone threatens you with violence in order to get your money or your valuables?
… someone kills you?
Question 9
Version 1 How likely do you think is it that you are spared of the following situation (...) within the next
twelve months? (...) How likely do you think is it that you do not get involved into the
following situation?
Version 2 How likely do you think is it that you come across the following situation (...) within the next
twelve months? How likely do you think is it that you get involved into the following
situation?
… a customer steals your purse and disappears.
… someone threatens you with violence in order to get your money or your valuables.
… another road user ignores your right of way and causes a crash.
Answer 1—By no means, 2—very unlikely, 3—unlikely, 4—partly unlikely, partly likely, 5—likely,
6—very likely
Please also indicate the likelihood in terms of percentages.
The items and answer scales were originally posed in German. Here, we show the English translation
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Fig. 1 Boxplots show the distribution of numerical probability estimates for both frames (being spared versus
become victim) for each offence. In the gain-frame, reversed probabilities (100-p) are shown to allow for
direct comparisons. Analyses refer to question 9
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Table 2 Arithmetic mean of subjective probability estimates for different victimizations (N in brackets)
Robbery Theft Car crash
Loss-frame 21.9 (87) 20.6 (87) 51.4 (85)
Gain-frame (100-p) 35.5 (99) 31.0 (99) 48.8 (96)
p Value (one-sided t-test) 0.0003 0.0042 0.7560
comparisons and for significance tests, we compare arithmetic means (see Table 2). For the
offences robbery and theft, probability estimates in the gain frame differ from those in the
loss-frame in the expected direction. For instance, the mean chance of being robbed is 35.5 %
in the gain frame compared to 21.9 % in the loss-frame (p < 0.01). For theft, hypothesis 1 can
be confirmed as well (p < 0.01). However, for the offence car accident, hypothesis 1 cannot
be confirmed. The values are very close to each other (51.4 % in the loss frame versus 48.8 %
in the gain frame). This might be due to the fact that car accidents are very frequent events.
In summary, we can confirm hypothesis 1 for the offences robbery and theft. Respondents
perceive higher victimization probabilities if asked for being spared of crimes compared to
become a victim of crime.
4 Communication of victimization probabilities
4.1 Hypotheses
Our first study demonstrated that the frame of reference affects the perception of victim-
ization probabilities. Now, we elaborate our findings in a second study. We show that the
frame of reference affects the communication of victimization probabilities. Thus, we argue
that the framing of risks affects both the perception and the communication of probabilities.
Differences in the communication of risks can be represented such that the verbal expressions
“likely” or “unlikely” have different meanings in different situations. Therefore, we study
variation in the assignment of numerical values to vague quantifiers. We argue that respon-
dents assign lower numerical values for rarer incidents than for more frequent incidents.
Bradburn and Miles (1979, p. 94) already speculated that “in short ‘often’ for an improbable
event is less than ‘often’ for a highly probable event.” In our case, we make use of our dif-
ferent versions of the questionnaires for gains and for losses. These two versions represent a
randomization of different frequencies of events. The event to become a victim of a partic-
ular crime is rarer than the event to be spared of the same crime. Consequently, we analyze
whether respondents assign different numerical values to the same vague quantifiers (e.g.
likely) in the gain-frame compared to the loss-frame. Respondents are expected to assign to
the event ‘become a victim of robbery’ lower numerical values compared to the event ‘being
spared of robbery’.6 We formulate hypothesis 2 as follows:
6 The frequency effect can be derived from Grice’ logic of conversation (Grice 1993). Here, it is assumed
that the respondent answers in accordance with the principle of relevance and with reference to the cate-
gory of relation. When the respondent is asked to estimate the probability to become a victim of robbery in
terms of absolute probabilities, the expected answer will be around “very unlikely”. As other respondents will
give a similar answer, this information would not be relevant. Following Grice’ reasoning, the respondent
rather assumes that her probability estimate in relation to all other respondents’ estimates will be of interest.
Therefore, the respondent will anchor the answer scale at her assumed average probability and adjust her own
subjective probability accordingly. For a more detailed description of the “anchoring and adjustment heuristic”
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Hypothesis 2 In the gain-frame (e.g. being spared of robbery), a particular verbal answer
category (e.g. likely) corresponds with higher numerical probabilities than in the loss-frame
(e.g. become a victim of robbery).
In a consecutive step, we analyze whether the response functions decrease with the severity
of the offence. In other words, we argue that for more severe offences, a “likely” victimization
refers to lower probabilities than for less severe offences.
Hypothesis 3 With increasing severity of the offence, the slope of the response functions
between vague quantifiers and numerical values decreases.
For example, we expect that respondents mean with “likely” lower likelihoods, when they
refer to becoming a victim of murder compared to becoming a victim of bill-dodging.7
4.2 Frequency of victimizations and communication patterns
We estimate six linear bivariate OLS-regressions. We map the verbal probability statements
on the numeric percentage scales for the victimizations robbery, theft and car crash (question
9). We estimate the regressions separately for the gain- and for the loss-frame. We plot the
resulting response functions graphically for each victimization (Wright et al. 1994, p. 481).8
The x-axis represents the verbal answer scales and the y-axis the values of the percentage
scales.
We can confirm hypothesis 2 for all victimizations. In the gain-frame (thus the more
frequent event), vague quantifiers correspond to higher likelihoods than in the loss-frame,
as shown in Figs. 2, 3, and 4. For theft and robbery, we observe considerable differences
between 20 and 25% for the two respective response functions. We refer to Tables 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, and 8 for exact values of the regression estimates (see Appendix).
So far, we investigated inter-personal effects. However, the intra-personal test reveals even
greater magnitude. Here, the same respondent estimates twice her likelihood to become a
victim of robbery; once for gains and once for losses. We randomly allocated two groups to
two different conditions. The experimental group had to estimate the likelihood to become
a victim of robbery first (question 1, loss-frame). After some questions, they were asked
to evaluate their likelihood of being spared to become a victim of robbery (question 9,
Footnote 6 continued
see Peters et al. (2006). Note that this answering process is independent of the frequency of the event and can
be applied to numerical as well as to verbal answer scales. However, when using a verbal scale, the focus is
on qualitative considerations (Zimmer 1983; Budescu and Wallsten 1995, p. 303). If the own probability is
evaluated in relation to the expected average probability of the others and this average probability is anchored
to the midpoint of the answer scale, a relevant and relational answer is possible for both, the frequent event
(‘being spared of robbery’) and the rare event (‘become victim of robbery’). In case of the numerical scale,
quantitative considerations are primarily of interest. Therefore, the anchor for frequent events (‘being spared
of robbery’) is set higher than for rare events (‘become victim of robbery’). This explains the frequency effect
in the mapping-analysis.
7 The two dimensions ‘frequency’ and ‘severity’ of an offence could not be manipulated independently of
each other. In order to exclude a possible confounding of the two effects, applications that enable to separate
both manipulations could be developed in future studies. A conceivable possibility in medicine would be to
analyze different types of cancer in order to manipulate ‘frequency’ (disease risk) and ‘severity’ (mortality
risk) independently of each other. For a more detailed discussion of this subject in the medical context see
Weber and Hilton (1990); Merz et al. (1991); Sutherland et al. (1991), and Budescu and Wallsten (1995,
p. 294).
8 In their study on mapping of vague quantifiers, Wright et al. (1994) also compute OLS regressions and
interpret the resulting regression lines as “response functions”.
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Fig. 2 Inter-personal framing for robbery (question 9). The solid regression line represents the response
function for the gain frame (being spared of robbery) and the dashed line for the loss frame (become victim
of robbery)
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Fig. 3 Inter-personal framing for theft (question 9). The solid regression line represents the response function
for the gain frame (being spared of theft) and the dashed line for the loss frame (become victim of theft)
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Fig. 4 Inter-personal framing for car accident (question 9). The solid regression line represents the response
function for the gain frame (being spared of a car accident) and the dashed line for the loss frame (become
victim of a car accident)
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Fig. 5 Intra-personal framing for robbery in the experimental condition. The solid regression line represents
the response function for the gain frame (being spared of a robbery) in question 9 and the dashed line represents
the response function for the loss frame (become victim of robbery) in question 1
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Fig. 6 Intra-personal framing for robbery in the control condition. The solid regression line represents the
response function for the loss frame (become victim of robbery) in question 9 and the dashed line represents
the response function for the loss frame (become victim of robbery) in question 1
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
by n
o m
ean
s
ve
ry u
nlik
ely
un
like
ly
part
ly u
nlik
ely,
 par
tly l
ikel
y
like
ly
ve
ry li
kely
Vague Quantifiers
Bill−dodging
Robbery
Murder
Fig. 7 Offence specific mapping: bill-dodging, robbery, murder (question 1)
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gain-frame). The control group answered twice the question to become victim of crime
(question 1 and 9 twice in the loss-frame). We report differences in response functions in
Figs. 5 and 6.
The same respondent assigns higher percentages to equivalent verbal probability expres-
sions in the gain-frame compared to the loss-frame. In contrast, persons who answered the
same question twice in the loss-frame gave consistent answers. Thus, results for hypothesis 2
can be confirmed with intra-personal tests as well. We conclude that respondents commu-
nicate with identical vague quantifiers higher subjective probabilities in cases of frequent
incidents compared to rare events. With increasing frequency of the events, the intercepts of
the response functions shift upwards.
4.3 Severity of victimizations and communication patterns
In hypothesis 3 we argue that with increasing severity of the offence, the slope of the response
function between vague quantifiers and numerical values decreases. We confirm hypothesis 3
with our analysis visualized in Fig. 7: With increasing severity, measured by the particular
kind of victimization, (ascending: bill-dodging, robbery, murder), identical verbal likelihood
expressions correspond to lower numerical probabilities. The slopes for the response func-
tions are as follows: Bill-dodging: b=13.6; robbery: b=9.2; murder: b=7.3. For more
details, see Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in the Appendix.
Comparisons between different offences reveal that respondents mean different likeli-
hoods by similar verbal probability expressions. For example, “very likely” to become a
victim of murder states a lower likelihood than “very likely” to become a victim of bill-dodg-
ing. In particular, the verbal label “very likely” for murder refers to a likelihood lower than
40% compared to the verbal label “very likely” for bill-dodging, which refers to a likelihood
higher than 60%.
5 Discussion
The frame of reference has great impact on the perception and communication of probability
statements. We demonstrate a wording effect on subjective probability estimates. Respon-
dents give different estimates for personal victimizations if survey questions are worded
differently. The subjective probability estimates differ depending on whether respondents
are asked for the risk to become a victim of a particular crime or for the risk of being spared
of a particular crime. Furthermore, we show that the same verbal probability expressions
have different meanings in different situations. On the one hand, “likely” refers to lower
probabilities in cases of rarer events (‘become victim’) compared to more frequent events
(‘being spared’). On the other hand, a “likely” victimization refers to lower probabilities in
cases of more severe victimizations compared to less severe victimizations.9
In conclusion, direct comparisons between proportions of different victimizations on cat-
egorical answer scales can be regarded as problematic, because interpretations of answer
categories depend on the wording, the frequency and the severity of the offence. Thus,
9 In the pretest of our instrument, investigations of respondents’ answering strategies on the basis of qual-
itative interviews (N=12) showed that victimization probabilities for frequent offences (e.g. bill-dodging)
in the preceding year were derived from the rate of personal victimizations in the past year. However, in the
case of rare offences, respondents rather oriented themselves at victimizations of other people. For example,
in the case of murder, newspaper articles were used for comparisons. Future studies could investigate these
answering strategies in more detail.
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survey answers are prone to biases in perception and communication of probabilities. For
example, respondents mean lower probabilities when they communicate their risk to become
a victim of murder as “very likely” compared to communicating their risk to become a victim
of robbery as “very likely”. However, for direct comparisons between different subjective
victimization risks, respondents have to use verbal answer categories consistently: A “very
likely” robbery should refer to similar probabilities as a “very likely” murder. This assumption
is not empirically met and thus individual and group differences for different risk evaluations
are not detectable if differences are only estimated by verbal answer categories.
A promising alternative to verbal answer scales are frequency formats in order to capture
subjective victimization risks. Frequency formats are based on findings of cognitive psychol-
ogy, according to which the presentation and communication of statistical information in form
of frequencies is more intuitive and understandable than alternative forms of presentation
such as probabilities and percentages: “Natural frequencies facilitate inferences because they
carry implicit information about base rates (…). They also correspond to the way in which
humans have experienced statistical information over most of their history.” (Hoffrage et al.
2000, p. 2261). A known problem is the subjective overestimation of risks associated with
rare events (fictitious example: “How likely is it that a randomly selected person from your
neighborhood will become a victim of a robbery during the next 12 months?”). Formulating
items to measure subjective risks in terms of frequencies encourages distributional thinking
and results in more realistic estimates of the base rate (fictitious example: “Imagine 1000
people from your neighborhood. How many of these people will become a victim of a rob-
bery during the next 12 months?”). As Teigen (1974) and Beuer-Krüssel and Krumpal (2009)
show, subjective overestimation of small probabilities decreases when respondents estimate
risks in frequencies rather than probabilities. Coutts (2002) points out that frequency for-
mats (“distributional perspective”) lead to more realistic, lower estimates of offence-specific
victimization risks than other formats (“singular perspective”).
Further research could investigate differences in framing-effects for verbal and numerical
scales. It can be argued that context effects should be even stronger for verbal scales (Moxey
and Sanford 2000, p. 238; Welkenhuysen et al. 2001). However, results are contradictory.
Jasper et al. (2001) reported only significant framing effects for numerical scales. It would be
interesting to investigate this interaction effect in more depth to improve our understanding of
survey responses in general. Such better understanding would enhance better informed and
substantiated choices of verbal versus numerical response scales. In medicine, for example,
the usage of verbal answer categories is widely rejected (Nakao and Axelrod 1983). As a
consequence, most articles in this area deal with advantages and disadvantages of different
numerical scales. Ghosh and Ghosh (2005) reviewed results from 52 studies. 17 studies dealt
with the question whether students of medicine and doctors could correctly interpret and
communicate probabilities: “Physicians demonstrate widely varying understanding of prob-
ability terms and NNT [number needed to treat].” (Ghosh and Ghosh 2005, p. 178) Even
greater problems were documented for patients in the remaining 35 studies. In contrast, in
some studies, verbal scales yield better results than numerical scales. Woloshin et al. (1999)
reported that women estimate their risk of breast cancer more realistically with verbal com-
pared to numerical scales. Women drastically overestimated their risk of breast cancer with
numerical scales. Finally, Windschitl and Wells (1996, p. 343) conclude that both, verbal and
numerical scales bear several advantages: “Results suggest that numeric measures tend to
elicit deliberate and rule-based reasoning from respondents, whereas verbal measures allow
for more associative and intuitive thinking”.
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Appendix
Bivariate linear OLS-regressions were estimated. For each victimization, the verbal answer
category scale is regressed on the numeric percentage scale.
Table 3 Response functions of
inter-personal framing, robbery
(see Fig. 2)
Delict: robbery b-Coefficient Standard
error
95% Conf.
interval
N
Loss-frame: become victim
Slope 12.9 1.6 (9.6; 16.1) 87
Intercept 9.2 2.4 (4.3; 14)
Gain-frame: spared
Slope 13.5 1.8 (9.8; 17.1) 99
Intercept 32.4 5.0 (22.5; 42.2)
Table 4 Response functions of
inter-personal framing, theft
(see Fig. 3)
Delict: theft b-Coefficient Standard
error
95% Conf.
interval
N
Loss-frame: become victim
Slope 9.7 1.5 (6.7; 12.8) 87
Intercept 12.8 2.2 (8.3; 17.2)
Gain-frame: spared
Slope 14.2 1.7 (10.9; 17.5) 99
Intercept 32.7 4.8 (23.1; 42.3)
Table 5 Response functions of
inter-personal framing, car
accident (see Fig. 4)
Delict: car accident b-Coefficient Standard
error
95% Conf.
interval
N
Loss-frame: become victim
Slope 13.1 1.6 (9.8; 16.3) 85
Intercept 19.9 4.4 (11.1; 28.6)
Gain-frame: spared
Slope 9.8 1.6 (6.7; 13) 96
Intercept 33 3.6 (25.9; 40.2)
Table 6 Response functions
of intra-personal framing,
experimental-condition
(see Fig. 5)
Delict: robbery b-Coefficient Standard
error
95% Conf.
interval
N
Loss-frame: become victim
Slope 8.0 2.0 (4; 11.9) 100
Intercept 13.7 2.6 (8.4; 18.9)
Gain-frame: spared
Slope 13.5 1.8 (9.8; 17.1) 99
Intercept 32.4 5.0 (22.5; 42.2)
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Table 7 Response functions
of intra-personal framing,
control-condition (see Fig. 6)
Delict: robbery b-Coefficient Standard
error
95% Conf.
interval
N
Loss-frame: become victim
Slope 10.4 2.1 (6.2; 14.5) 89
Intercept 13.0 3.2 (6.7; 19.3)
Loss-frame: become victim
Slope 12.9 1.6 (9.6; 16.1) 87
Intercept 9.2 2.4 (4.3; 14)
Table 8 Response functions of
offence specific mapping,
loss-frame (see Fig. 7)
b-Coefficient Standard
error
95% Conf.
interval
N
Bill-dodging
Slope 13.6 1.3 (11.1; 16.1) 189
Intercept 10.8 2.8 (5.2; 16.4)
Robbery
Slope 9.2 1.4 (6.4; 12.1) 189
Intercept 13.4 2.0 (9.4; 17.4)
Murder
Slope 7.3 1.1 (5.1; 9.5) 186
Intercept 9.5 1.3 (6.9; 12.2)
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